Massively parallel collaboration : a literature review. by Dornburg, Courtney C. et al.
SANDIA REPORT 
 
SAND2007-5907 
Unlimited Release 
Printed September 2007 
 
 
Massively Parallel Collaboration:  
A Literature Review 
 
Courtney C. Dornburg, Susan Marie Stevens, James C. Forsythe, 
and George S. Davidson  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepared by 
Sandia National Laboratories 
Albuquerque, New Mexico  87185 and Livermore, California  94550 
 
Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, 
a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy’s 
National Nuclear Security Administration under Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. 
 
 
 
Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited. 
 
 
 
 
  
 2
 
 
Issued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United 
States Department of Energy by Sandia Corporation. 
NOTICE:  This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency 
of the United States Government.  Neither the United States Government, nor any agency 
thereof, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors, or their 
employees, make any warranty, express or implied, or assume any legal liability or 
responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, 
apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represent that its use would not infringe 
privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or 
service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily 
constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States 
Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors or subcontractors.  The 
views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United 
States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors. 
 
Printed in the United States of America. This report has been reproduced directly from 
the best available copy. 
 
Available to DOE and DOE contractors from 
U.S. Department of Energy 
Office of Scientific and Technical Information 
P.O. Box 62 
Oak Ridge, TN  37831 
 
Telephone: (865)576-8401 
Facsimile: (865)576-5728 
E-Mail: reports@adonis.osti.gov 
Online ordering:  http://www.doe.gov/bridge  
 
 
 
Available to the public from 
U.S. Department of Commerce 
National Technical Information Service 
5285 Port Royal Rd 
Springfield, VA  22161 
 
Telephone: (800)553-6847 
Facsimile: (703)605-6900 
E-Mail: orders@ntis.fedworld.gov 
Online order:  http://www.ntis.gov/help/ordermethods.asp?loc=7-4-0#online  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 3
 
 
SAND2007-5907 
Unlimited Release 
Printed September 2007 
 
 
Massively Parallel Collaboration:  A Literature Review 
 
 
Courtney C. Dornburg and Susan Marie Stevens 
Reliability Assessment and Human Factors 
 
 James C. Forsythe 
Cognitive & Exploratory Systems 
 
George S. Davidson 
Computational Biology 
 
Sandia National Laboratories 
P.O. Box 5800 
Albuquerque, NM 87185-1316 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The present paper explores group dynamics and electronic communication, two 
components of wicked problem solving that are inherent to the national security 
environment (as well as many other business environments).  First, because there can be 
no ‘right’ answer or solution without first having agreement about the definition of the 
problem and the social meaning of a ‘right solution,’ these problems (often) 
fundamentally relate to the social aspects of groups, an area with much empirical research 
and application still needed.  Second, as computer networks have been increasingly used 
to conduct business with decreased costs, increased information accessibility, and rapid 
document, database, and message exchange, electronic communication enables a new 
form of problem solving group that has yet to be well understood, especially as it relates 
to solving wicked problems.   
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Massively Parallel Collaboration: A literature review 
 
“Wicked,” or ill-defined problems, are at the very core of the national security mission; 
however, very little is empirically known or generally understood about how best to solve 
such challenges.  In fact, “wicked” problems are those problems that by their very 
definition are so tangled that there is not agreement about their definitions, much less 
their solutions.  The present paper explores two components of wicked problem solving 
that are inherent to the national security environment (as well as many other business 
environments):  group dynamics and electronic communications.  First, because there can 
be no ‘right’ answer or solution without first having agreement about the definition of the 
problem and the social meaning of a ‘right solution,’ these problems (often) 
fundamentally relate to the social aspects of groups (Allison, 2006).  For the purposes of 
this paper, groups are defined as “two or more persons who share common goals, whose 
fates are interdependent, who have a stable relationship, and who recognize that they 
belong to a group” (Baron & Byrne, 1997, p. 471) 1.  Second, as computer networks have 
been increasingly used to conduct business with decreased costs, increased information 
accessibility, and rapid document, database, and message exchange (Siegel, Dubrovsky, 
Kiesler, & McGuire, 1986, as referenced by Baltes et al., 2002), electronic 
communication enables a new form of problem solving group that has yet to be well 
understood, especially as it relates to solving wicked problems.   
 
As proposed by Rittel and Webber (1973), “wicked problems” stand in contrast to the 
more linear nature of “tame” problems and may therefore demand different, less linear-
based, solution methods.  Wicked problems have incomplete, changing, and contradictory 
requirements.  Solutions to them are often difficult to recognize as such because of 
complex interdependencies.  Classic examples of wicked problems include 
environmental, economic, and political issues (for an extreme case, consider what it 
would take to “solve” terrorism, where even the term terrorism is highly controversial 
and difficult to define).  By contrast, tame problems are better structured, more linear 
challenges like those of mathematics, chess, or puzzle solving.  Tame problems: “1) have 
a well-defined and stable problem statement, 2) have a definite stopping point, i.e. when 
the solution is reached, 3) have a solution which can be objectively evaluated as right or 
wrong, 4) belong to a class of similar problems which are all solved in the same similar 
way, 5) have solutions which can be easily tried and abandoned, and 6) come with a 
limited set of alternative solutions” (Conklin, 2005, p. 11).  By contrast, wicked problems 
violate at least one of these characteristics, although this characteristic initially may not 
be apparent. 
  
                                                 
1
 In the present paper, “group decision making” includes groups of 
individuals with a relationship to one another, and does not include 
voting (sometimes referred to as the social aggregation of individual 
votes).  We see this distinction as important because of the existing 
theory and process differences between group decision making and 
voting, as well as because of the increased time and effort investment 
required of the former (Greitemeyer, Brodbeck, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, 
2006).   
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Group Dynamics 
 
Although wicked problems are not constrained to groups (i.e., an individual may 
encounter a wicked problem), the two are often related (Conklin, 2005).  For example, 
projects and problem solving are typically social in nature (Conklin, 2005).  Groups are 
typically composed of members with variable levels of expertise and often work to solve 
problems that require them to combine their input and form some type of aggregate 
product or decision” (Bonner, 2004, p. 277).  Moreover, problems whose solution(s) 
require large groups of individuals to change their mindsets and behaviors are likely to be 
a wicked problem in and of themselves.  Thus, understanding group dynamics is a key 
component to understanding how to best solve wickedly difficult problems.   
 
Anticipating how groups can best be utilized to solve wickedly difficult problems is a 
daunting task for (at least) two reasons.  First, the relevant group literature is vast, 
spanning multiple psychological definitions, levels of granularity, academic disciplines, 
and countries.  Second, group dynamics involves anticipating the complex interactions 
between potential group, individual, process, and contextual variables.   
 
In terms of definition, group dynamics relate to decision-making, as well as problem 
solving.  While both are related, the former is a choice among given alternatives, and the 
latter focuses more on correct problem identification in that it is a determination of how 
to proceed from a given state to a desired goal.  Thus, the relevant knowledge base 
includes literatures examining group dynamics, problem solving, and decision-making.  
These literatures are vast, with the PsychInfo database alone noting 12,290 published 
works citing “group dynamics” as a key word string, 30,386 citing “problem solving” as 
a key word string, and 40,652 citing “decision making” as a key word string.  A strong 
group research theme has also emerged within Europe and Japan (Davis, 1996), which 
further expands upon this literature. 
     
A survey of group dyamincs is also complicated by its many levels of granularity, 
including sociological/cultural, psychological, and potentially, even biological.  What 
was once primarily a social psychology emphasis has grown into an intraindividual 
emphasis, as well as a multidisciplinary study.  Social psychology has experienced an 
inward paradigm shift focusing more upon the individual’s effect upon the group, and 
less upon external causes (e.g., behavior sequences over time, multiple-person units, etc.; 
Steiner, 1986); whereas, group-level research topics have evolved into various specific, 
multidisciplinary problems (e.g., communication, organizational research, social decision 
making including social dilemmas, bargaining and negotiation, experimental games, and 
consensual decision making; Davis, 1996).   
 
The study of groups is also complicated by a social psychology shift relating to a multi-
disciplinary and more global literature.  In 1974, Steiner posed his famous question, 
“Whatever happened to the group in social psychology?”  According to Davis (1996), in 
the mid-1900’s, when behaviorism began to lose its hold on psychology, there was an 
accompanying inward shift within social psychology such that questions about 
intraindividual life became the principal research interest.  One possible reason for this 
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shift may relate to the multiplied subjects and related costs group level research requires 
over individual level research (Davis).    
 
While Steiner (1986) concluded that paradigm shifts in social psychology favored the 
intraindividual emphasis at the expense of external causes (including sequences of 
behavior over time and multiple-person units), Davis has offered a contrasting 
hypothesis.  Davis has suggested that group-level research topics have evolved from 
social psychology into various specific, multidisciplinary problems (e.g., communication, 
organizational research, social decision making including social dilemmas, bargaining 
and negotiation, experimental games, and consensual decision making).  He further 
suggests that group research continues as a strong theme in European and Japanese social 
psychology, although the cause of this divergence from North American psychology 
remains unclear.   
 
Our own literature search supports Davis’s conclusion that there is a vast quantity of 
multidisciplinary group research.  For example, comparing 18 related keyword strings 
(i.e., group decision making, decision success, face to face communication, computer 
mediated communication, distributed teaming, collaborative problem solving, group 
problem solving, electronic decision making, computer supported cooperative work, 
social cognition,  group dynamics, group performance, computer supported collaboration, 
on line group, on line interaction, collaborative engineering, information fusion and 
humans, large group dynamics) to titles and abstracts back to 1991, Kevin Boyack2 found 
2586 related peer-reviewed articles.  These did not include social sciences data from 
2004-2005, so this is a conservative estimate that underscores the difficulty in 
understanding a unified empirical picture of group research.    
 
In addition to the group literature’s vastness, the area is further complicated by the 
necessity to anticipate complex interactions between potential group, individual, process, 
and contextual variables.  These complexities can be appreciated in terms of the research 
examining effective group size, the benefits of groups, and the costs of groups. 
 
How many people comprise an effective group?  The answer is complex and context 
dependent.  Moreland, Levine, and Wingert (1996) have concluded that the ideal group 
size is not well understood.  It probably depends on many variables including the task 
being examined, the ambitiousness of the group’s goal, and the research methodology 
that is instantiated.  While anecdotal evidence suggests that work teams should consist of 
4 to 12 members (Katzenbach & Smith, 1993; Scharf, 1989; Parker, 1994; Nasser, 1988), 
field observations indicate that people naturally tend to break up into 2 or 3 person 
groups for social interactions (Bakeman & Beck, 1974; Burgess, 1984; Desportes & 
Lemaine, 1988; James, 1951).  When complaints are examined, small discussion groups 
containing five members were the ideal (Slater, 1958); yet, when people are asked to 
describe the ideal size of a group, they report that they prefer groups containing a dozen 
members (Carron, Widmeyer, & Brawler, 1989; Cini, Moreland, Levine, 1993; cf. Buys 
& Larson, 1979; McPherson, 1983).        
                                                 
2 Personal communication concerning survey of the indicated abstracts using the Sandia National 
Laboratories literature mining tool, VxInsight, 2006. 
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Because there is no simple way to study groups, correlates of group size have also been 
examined.  While larger groups enjoy advantages in their resources (including expertise, 
time and money; Dennis & Valacich, 1993; Grofman, Owen, & Feld, 1983; Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1993, Hill, 1982; Wegner, 1987), diversity (Bond & Keys, 1993; N. Miller & 
Davidson-Podgorny, 1987), and legitimacy (Singh & Lumsden, 1990), smaller groups 
may excel in terms of coordination (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Latane, Williams, & Harkins, 
1979; McGrath & Rotchford, 1983; Stasser & Taylor, 1991), motivation (Albanese & 
Van Fleet, 1985; Karau & Williams, 1993; Shepperd, 1993), and cooperation advantages 
(Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Hamburger, Guyer, & Fox, 1975).  
 
To anticipate how groups can best be utilized to solve wickedly difficult problems, one 
must also understand how group, individual, and contextual interactions relate to 
potential group benefits and costs.  While groups satisfy important psychological and 
social needs, and also allow for achieving goals that are unattainable by individuals (e.g., 
groups provide insight that is often unavailable at the individual level; Paulus, 1989, as 
cited by Baron & Byrne), groups also relate to negative decision-making consequences.  
Understanding the variables that underlie these divergent outcomes is difficult.  
 
Group decision-making assumes at least two forms of value including individual 
knowledge gains and improved decision quality.  First, individual members may broaden 
their knowledge base by learning new information about the decision problem through 
the diverse knowledge and different perspectives shared through group discussion 
(Greitemeyer, Brodbeck, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, 2006).  Consequently, each individual is 
assumed to acquire new information about the problem that regardless of the group’s 
final decision, might later confer benefit.  Second, groups have been assumed to improve 
decision quality (e.g., McGrath, 1984, as referenced by Greitemeyer et al., 2006), because 
the broader knowledge base that a group provides allows for better decisions than an 
individual’s limited knowledge base (Hastie, 1986, as referenced by Greitemeyer et al., 
2006).   
 
Groups produce added value to decision-making when group members recognize the 
available expertise and use that knowledge to influence their decision process.  As 
discussed by Bonner (2004), groups have outperformed the average individual (Hastie, 
1986; Hill, 1982; Kelly & Thibaut, 1969), have performed at the level of an equivalent 
number of individuals, and have outperformed even the best comparison individuals 
(Laughlin et al., 2002, 2003).   
 
Unfortunately, the knowledge gains and improved decision quality that are at the heart of 
the group decision-making value are rarely realized (for overviews, see Mojzisch & 
Schulz-Hardt, 2005, as well as Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003, as referenced by Greitemeyer 
et al., 2006).  As explained below, potential pitfalls of group decision making have been 
related to the information sampling model, groupthink, and social loafing, and 
mitigations for each are not always reliable and well understood.   
 
  
 11
As discussed by Greitemeyer et al. (2006), the information sampling model suggests that 
groups will discuss and repeat shared information to a greater degree than unshared 
information (Larson, Christensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996; Stasser, Stewart, & 
Wittenbaum, 1995; for summary, see Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1996), the effect of which 
directly counters knowledge gains among group members (see also Larson, Christensen, 
Franz, & Abbott, 1998; Lavery et al., 1999; Stasser & Stewart, 1992; Stasser & Titus, 
1985).  Such groups fail to find solutions (e.g., fail to solve “hidden profiles,” the best 
alternative given all pieces of information available to the group), because they fail to 
share all the available information.  When the best solution is thus “hidden” from the 
group, they predominantly choose the alternative that is implied by the shared 
information (Larson et al, 1998; Stasser & Stewart, 1992).     
 
Winquist and Larson (1998, as cited by Greitemeyer et al., 2006) use their integrative 
dual-process model to point out two processes leading to the domination of shared 
information in group discussions.  First, there is a probabilistic (quasi-automatic) 
sampling advantage of shared information.  Thus, more shared than unshared information 
is discussed and this shared information becomes more likely than unshared information 
to affect the final decision (Larson et al., 1998; Winguist & Larson, 1998).  This 
sampling advantage is reduced over time because to the extent that individuals wish to 
avoid redundancy, they will begin to sample from unshared information as the 
discussions temporally progress.  However, the second process contributing to the 
dominance of shared information then becomes important.  Group members frequently 
communicate and negotiate their individual preferences during group discussion rather 
than using the discussion as a tool for information exchange (Gigone & Hastie, 1993, 
1997, as cited by Greitemeyer et al.) by predominantly including information that is 
consistent with their pre-discussion preferences (Dennis, 1996, as cited by Greitemyer et 
al.).  Consequently, the increased probability that unshared information will be included 
and integrated into later temporal phases of the discussion is not typically realized, 
because group discussion and decision are largely based on shared information.      
 
Group disagreement is expected to counteract the dominance of shared information 
because of the mediating mechanisms discussed above.  Thus, there should be a reduced 
probability of premature consensus, and an increased likelihood of intensive information 
exchange, when there is conflict and controversy.  In support of this hypothesis, 
Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, Frey, and Schulz-Hardt (2002) have demonstrated that 
increases in pre-discussion dissent correspond to increases in the amount of information 
that is discussed.  Groups have been shown to benefit from pre-discussion dissent (e.g., 
increased knowledge gains, more likely to solve the hidden profile, greater discussion 
intensity and less discussion bias in the dissenting groups) even when none of the group 
members initially favors the best solution (Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch, 
Kerschreiter, and Frey, 2005; see also Kerr & Tindale for other moderators of unshared 
information).   
 
While the aforementioned data suggest that controversy about the solution facilitates both 
knowledge gains and improved decision quality, these benefits are not reliable.   
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For example, dialectical techniques that implement debate that is independent of the 
actual group members’ preferences have been developed (e.g., devil’s advocacy, Herbert 
& Estes, 1977; dialectical inquiry; Mason & Mitroff, 1981); however, they have 
demonstrated only partial success.  Greitemeyer et al. (2006) found that while 
implementing a controversial debate independent of group members’ true preferences 
resulted in decreased sampling bias and increased shared and unshared information, these 
positive effects were not sufficient to improve decision quality such that it facilitated the 
hidden solution.     
 
In addition to information sampling, a second pitfall to group decision making involves 
groupthink, or “the tendency of highly cohesive groups to assume that their decisions 
can’t be wrong:  that all members must support the group’s decision and ignore 
information contrary to it” (Baron & Byrne, 1997, p. 608).  This phenomenon occurs 
when individuals are so committed to the group that they feel it is invulnerable, and 
members, concerned with maintaining consensus, stifle criticism (Pettijohn, 1995).  Thus, 
groupthink occurs not only because of the individual’s desire for conformity, but also 
because of group pressures.  According to Janis (1982), group norms emerge that: a) 
prevent individuals from actively considering alternative course of action, b) support the 
idea that the group is incapable of error, and c) quickly silence group members with 
lingering doubts.  Groupthink has also been related to the group’s overly simplistic 
thinking (see Janis, 1982 for a discussion of Tetlock’s systematic content analysis study).   
 
Groupthink has been identified as one of the most important dangers in decision-making 
groups; one that leads to costly and potentially disastrous decisions (Hinsz, 1995).  Janis 
has argued that a group displaying most of the groupthink symptoms previously 
described will also display defective decision-making symptoms3.  These include 
inadequacies in: surveying alternatives and objectives, examining risks associated with 
the preferred choice, reappraising previously rejected alternatives, searching and 
processing information (e.g., exercising a selective bias), and contingency planning.  The 
decision making deficiencies related to groupthink can be mitigated in three ways (Baron 
& Byrne, 1997).  First, groupthink can be addressed by promoting skepticism and open 
inquiry (e.g., playing devil’s advocate and intentionally finding faults with each option).  
Next, second-chance meetings, in which group members are asked to express their 
lingering doubts about a decision, can be useful.  Finally, a second group, separate from 
the initial decision making group, can make a determination regarding whether the 
decision should be upheld.   
 
In addition to information sampling and groupthink, a third group decision making pitfall 
is social loafing.  Social loafing involves “reductions in motivation and effort when 
individuals work collectively in a group compared to when they work individually or as 
                                                 
3
 While groupthink concurrence-seeking is typically related to negative 
outcomes, Janis (1982) points out that it may occasionally contribute 
to the positive effects of morale maintenance.  However, he cautions 
that these positive effects are generally outweighed by poor decision-
making outcomes. 
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independent co-actors” (Baron & Byrne, 1997, p. 612), and applies to diverse work 
conditions (Brickner, Harkins, & Ostrom, 1986; Harkins, 1987).  It occurs among males 
and females and across age ranges (Williams & Williams, 1981).  Interestingly though, 
its influence is stronger among males (Karau & Williams, 1993, as cited by Kerr & 
Tindale, 2004) and in Western (as compared to Asian cultures; Yamaguchi, Okamoto, & 
Oka, 1985).  It is stronger among individualists (Erez & Somech, 1996; Wagner, 1995, 
cited by Kerr & Tindale, 2004) and those who view themselves as better than others 
(Charbonnier et al., 1998; Huguet et al., 1999, as cited by Kerr & Tindale, 2004).  Social 
loafing has been explained through both diffusion of responsibility as well as expectancy-
valence theory.  Social impact theory uses Latane’s (1981) diffusion of responsibility to 
suggest that increases in group size negatively impact individual members’ feelings of 
responsibility.  This results in decreased individual effort.  A similar idea by Harkins & 
Szymanski (1989) suggests that individual motivation is decreased because his/her 
contributions can’t be evaluated on an individual basis.  A more comprehensive 
explanation of social loafing is Karau and Williams’s (1993) collective effort model 
(CEM).  This model explains social loafing through an extension of expectancy-valence 
theory.  Expectancy-valence theory suggests that an individual’s work effort relates to 
expectancy, instrumentality and valence, where expectancy is a belief that working hard 
will lead to better performance, instrumentality is a belief that better performance will be 
rewarded and recognized, and valence relates to the available rewards’ value and 
desirability.   
 
Karau and Williams argue that an individual’s perceived links between effort and 
outcome are weaker in group tasks than in individual tasks.  Their meta-analysis 
examining dozens of social loafing studies offered support for each of the following of 
CEM’s predictions.  In fact social loafing is weakest in smaller groups, in tasks that are 
perceived by the individual as intrinsically interesting or important, when working with 
others whom they respect, when the individual perceives that his/her contribution to the 
group product is unique, when individuals expect their coworkers to perform poorly, and 
within cultures emphasizing individual outcome and effort (like the Western versus Asian 
culture difference previously described). 
 
Social loafing can be reduced in several ways (Baron & Byrne, 1997).  First, it is reduced 
when individual effort and/or output is readily identifiable (Williams, Harkins, & Latane, 
1981), as well as when an individual views his/her contribution as unique (Weldon & 
Mustari, 1988).  Social loafing is also reduced when individual commitment to the task’s 
success is increased so that pressure to work diligently offsets social loafing tendencies 
(Brickner et al., 1986), and when the importance of the task is increased (Karau & 
Williams, 1993).  Finally, strengthening group cohesiveness has also (preliminarily) been 
related to a reduction in social loafing.  It is hypothesized that the more closely a person’s 
role ties to the group’s performance, the less likely that person is to engage in social 
loafing (Karau & Williams, 1993).  For example, high-status people, like leaders, may 
perceive a closer link between their effort and the group’s performance.  However, there 
is not yet strong evidence of this last effect. 
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In addition to the pitfalls of information sampling, group think, and social loafing, group 
decision making may also be influenced by persuasion.  While the dominant paradigm in 
recent group decision-making research has focused on information sharing, another 
paradigm, the influence of combining individual preferences, still receives some 
empirical and theoretical attention (see also Davis’s Social Judgment Scheme model and 
Crott et al.’s median model; as discussed by Kerr & Tindale, 2004).  Persuasion has been 
defined as “efforts to change our attitudes” (Baron & Byrne, 1997, p. 128).  Traditionally, 
persuasion was described as addressing various aspects of “Who says what to whom and 
with what effect?”  This approach (sometimes referred to as the Yale approach) focused 
on identifying the characteristics of communicators, communications, and audiences that 
influenced persuasion.  While these findings have not always been robust, the generally 
accepted results include the following (Baron & Byrne, p. 129): 
o Experts are more persuasive than non-experts (Hovland & Weiss, 1951). 
o Messages that do not appear to be designed to change our attitudes are 
often more successful in this respect than ones that seem intended to reach 
this goal (Walster & Festinger, 1962). 
o Attractive communicators are more effective in changing attitudes than 
unattractive ones (Kiesler & Kiesler, 1969). 
o People are sometimes more susceptible to persuasion when they are 
distracted by some extraneous event than when they are paying full 
attention to what is being said (Allyn & Festinger, 1961). 
o Individuals relatively low in self-esteem are often easier to persuade than 
those high in self-esteem (Janis, 1954). 
o When an audience holds attitudes contrary to those of a would-be 
persuader, it is often more effective for the communicator to adopt a two-
sided approach, in which both sides of the argument are presented, than a 
one-sided approach. 
o People who speak rapidly are often more persuasive than persons who 
speak more slowly (Miller et al., 1976).  Although this finding holds when 
speakers present views that are different from those of their audience 
(Smith & Shaffer, 1991), fast talkers may actually be less persuasive when 
they present views that are consistent with their audience.   
o Persuasion can be enhanced by messages that arouse strong emotions 
(especially fear) in the audience, particularly when the communication 
provides specific recommendations about how a change in attitudes or 
behavior will prevent the negative consequences described in the fear-
provoking message (Leventhal, Singer, & Jones, 1965).  
 
Although the traditional approach has addressed much about the when and how of 
persuasion, it has not adequately captured the why of persuasion.  More modern 
approaches have used a cognitive perspective on persuasion (Petty et al, 1994).  For 
example, the cognitive response analysis focuses on what people think about during 
exposure to persuasive messages and how basic cognitive processes determine attitude 
change (Petty & Caccioppo, 1986; Petty, Unnava, & Strathman, 1991). 
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Understanding group decision-making is a daunting task that relates to understanding a 
complex set of processes and contexts.  According to Kerr and Tindale (2004), a common 
criticism of small-group research has been that it oversimplifies these processes into 
linear, antecedent-consequence relationships, focusing on only one or a few variables, at 
the expense of all others.  Thus, they conclude that the difficulty is “how can this 
complexity best be analyzed and understood?”  Kerr and Tindale suggest that one “recent 
and promising way of addressing such questions” includes utilizing modern information 
technology to pose questions that might not arise in face-to-face groups (e.g., 
computerized brainstorming, electronic groups, using virtual reality to create and analyze 
group processes; Blascovich, 2001; see also McGrath & Berdahl, 1998).  In addition to 
the complex processes inherent to group decision-making, its contexts are also 
complicated.  For example, certain group processes that are ineffective in one context 
might be quite useful as heuristics in most other contexts.  In fact, as Kerr and Tindale 
suggest, many group norms may have developed because they work well most of the time 
with little processing effort (e.g., tendency for discussing shared information:  if all the 
members of a group know something, it probably does have more validity that is only 
known by one member).   
 
Groups, ubiquitous in contemporary work environments as the way to “get things done,” 
seem a good fit to solve the wickedly difficult problems core to the national security 
mission; however the current group research leaves unclear how this is best 
accomplished.  From what is currently known, groups may offer the benefits of:  1) 
increasing a knowledge base and 2) improving decision quality, which seem to fit well 
with the incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements of wicked problems, as 
well as with the identification of solutions that are often difficult to recognize.  
Importantly, though, for groups to fully harness their decision-making potential and 
produce value commensurate with the associated increases in employee time and effort, 
one must mitigate against their potential pitfalls (e.g., information sampling, groupthink, 
and social loafing along with the potential modulator of persuasion).  The current 
literature leaves unclear the theoretical and empirical bounds of these potential pitfalls 
because of the complexities associated with studying groups, as well because of the 
current, non-unified, multi-disciplinary approach.  Thus, future efforts geared toward a 
better understanding of group decision-making and its potential application to wickedly 
difficult problems must address the vastness of the current group literature, as well as the 
complex interactions between potential group, individual, process, and contextual 
variables. 
  
Face-to-face vs. Computer-mediated groups 
 
As computer networks attain omnipresence within work environments, electronic 
communication offers a new form of problem solving group, potentially interesting to 
solving wicked problems.  Over the last 20 years, computer networks have been 
increasingly used to conduct business, because they convey decreased costs; increased 
information accessibility, and rapid document, database, and message exchange (Siegel, 
Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & McGuire, 1986, as referenced by Baltes et al., 2002).  As 
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compared to face-to-face groups, electronic groups allow for more flexible (e.g., non-
simultaneous and geographically distributed) forms of intragroup communication; 
however, they can also foster stronger group identification (Lea et al, 2001, as cited by 
Kerr & Tindale, 2004) and adherence to group norms (Spears et al, 1990; although see 
Douglas & McGarty, 2001, both as cited by Kerr & Tindale, 2004).  Interestingly, this 
networking growth has not fully addressed questions about the decision quality arising 
from the computer-mediated communication (CMC) groups or interaction differences 
between online versus face-to face meetings.  In fact, what empirical evidence is 
available “raises significant questions about the appropriateness of heavy reliance on 
computer-mediated communication for organizational group decision making” (Baltes et 
al., p. 175).   
  
As described by Roch and Ayman (2005), the research into how technological 
innovations have affected team functioning hasn’t kept pace with the advances.  In 
discussing their meta-analysis, Baltes et al. (2002) concluded, “one of the most surprising 
findings in the present study was that, despite the wealth of writing and research on the 
topic of computer-mediated communication, there are relatively few studies that include 
the basic methodological rigor and statistical detail to be included in a meta-analysis” (p. 
171).  Furthermore, many of the studies focused on member satisfaction rather than 
effectiveness.  In fact, their meta-analysis included only 22 published and 5 unpublished 
studies, and was the first to empirically consolidate and summarize research on computer 
mediated communications (e.g., narrative literature review:  Bordia, 1997, as cited by 
Baltes et al.).  A previous narrative review of the literature examining communication 
technology’s affect on work teams (Hollingshead & McGrath, 1995, as discussed by 
Roch & Ayman) identified only 8 studies that compared face-to-face with computer 
mediated team performance in tasks with a correct answer (“intellective” tasks).   
 
Both the Baltes et al. (2002) and the Hollingshead and McGrath (1995) studies found that 
computer mediated teams result in less successful group decisions than face to face teams 
on intellective tasks; however these effect sizes were not large and their reasons not well 
understood.  Generally, Baltes et al. found that “computer-mediated decision-making 
groups are rarely if ever more effective than face-to-face groups, that CMC group 
members are rarely if ever more satisfied than member of face-to-face groups, and that 
CMC groups rarely if ever take less time than face-to-face groups.  At best, CMC groups 
are not significantly worse than face-to-face groups, and even these results occur only in 
very unusual and uncommon organizational conditions” (p. 175) like when discussion 
contributions are anonymous and when groups have unlimited decision-making time.   
 
One proposed advantage of CMC groups over face-to-face groups is that CMC groups 
might benefit from Communication Openness; however, this hypothesis has not been 
borne out by the existing data.  Communication Openness, “which is encouraging, or at 
least permitting, the open expression of views divergent from one’s own” (Baltes et al., 
2002, p. 172) has been related to decision making quality (e.g., Buchanan, 1997, as 
referenced by Baltes et al.).  Because CMC groups would seem to partially obscure status 
differences, it has been argued that these groups would benefit from increased 
participation across all group members (e.g., Dubrovsky et al., 1991; Hiltz et al., 1986; 
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McGuire et al., 1987; Siegel et al., 1986; Weisband, 1992; all as cited by Baltes et al.).  In 
contrast to this suggestion, Baltes et al. found that CMC groups did not out-perform face-
to-face groups.  Instead, CMC groups for whom individual identity was anonymous did 
not significantly differ from face-to-face groups in performance.  Interestingly, when 
individuals were not given anonymity, group performance was actually significantly 
worse than face-to-face performance.  It has been argued that performance differences 
may be related to the lack of social cues inherent in computer mediated teams (Baltes et 
al., 2002); however, the lack of social cues might also be thought to increase performance 
in that this deficit may focus persuasion based on logic and facts rather than on nonverbal 
dominance (e.g., gender, race, age, etc.; Roch & Ayman, 2005).   
 
Another proposed advantage of CMC groups over face-to-face groups has been related to 
the potential advantage of electronic communication in overcoming large group 
communication difficulties.  However, the hypothesized advantage of CMC relative to 
face-to-face groups was not found, nor were negative CMC outcomes minimized in 
larger CMC groups (Baltes et al., 2002).  In other words, group size did not impact any 
differences between face-to-face groups and CMC groups in terms of decision quality 
(although it is worth noting that groups were fairly small, with n = 3 for small groups and 
n = 4 or more for larger groups across the Baltes et al. meta-analysis).     
 
CMC groups demonstrate less participation, or fewer verbal acts, than face-to-face 
groups (as discussed by Roch & Ayman, 2005, less total communication:  Straus & 
McGrath, 1994; fewer remarks:  Siegel, Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & McGuire, 1986; shared 
less information:  Hedlund, Ilgen, & Hollenback, 1998; Hollingshead, 1996a, 1996b; 
Smith & Vanecek, 1988).  “The computer does not simply reduce the participation of 
loquacious group members or simply increase the participation of quiet group members; 
it does not ‘democratize’ group discussion, as some researchers have implied.  Rather, it 
reduces participation for all participants” (Hollingshead & McGrath, p. 74 as cited by 
Roch & Ayman, 2005).  The finding that CMC groups communicate less and, therefore, 
share less information than FTF groups is a very robust finding” (Roch & Ayman, p. 17). 
 
In fact, diminished individual participation (for the majority of participants) has also been 
noted as a problem within internet groups.  Nielsen (2006) enumerates the many places 
on the web in which a very small minority of users account for a disproportionate amount 
of activity and content.  This participation inequality, as he calls it, has been documented 
in Usenet newsgroups, Internet mailing lists, CompuServe bulletin boards, and large 
company internal discussion boards.  Nielsen suggests that user participation generally 
follows a 90-9-1 rule in which 90% of users are lurkers (i.e., read or observing without 
contributing), 9 % of users contribute occasionally, and 1% of users account for most 
contributions.  These inequities are even greater for weblogs where the rule is 95-5-.1.  In 
other words, of 1.1 billion Internet users, only 55 million (5%) have weblogs, and only 
.1% of users post daily.  Similarly, less than 1% of Amazon.com’s customers contribute 
reviews and only .2% of Wikipedia’s users are active contributors.  
 
Although Nielsen notes that participation inequality can’t be overcome, he suggests that 
it can be partially mitigated through the following: 
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• Make it easier to contribute.  The lower the overhead, the more people will jump 
through the hoop.  For example, Netflix lets users rate movies by clicking a star 
rating, which is much easier than writing a natural-language review. 
• Make participation a side effect.  Even better, let users participate with zero effort 
by making their contributions a side effect of something else they’re doing.  For 
example, Amazon’s “people who bought this book, bought these other books”  
recommendations are a side effect of people buying books.  You don’t have to do 
anything special to have your book preferences entered into the system.  Will Hill 
coined the term read wear for this type of effect:  the simple activity of reading (or 
using) something will “sear’ it down and thus leave its marks – just like a 
cookbook will automatically fall open to the recipe you prepare the most. 
• Edit, don’t create.  Let users build their contributions by modifying existing 
templates rather than creating complete entities from scratch.  Editing a template 
is more enticing and has a gentler learning curve than facing the horror of a 
blank page.  In avatar-based systems like Second Life, for example, most users 
modify standard-issue avatars rather than create their own. 
• Reward – but don’t over-reward – participants.  Rewarding people for 
contributing will help motivate users who have lives outside the Internet, and thus 
will broaden your participant base.  Although money is always good, you can also 
give contributors preferential treatment (such as discounts or advance notice of 
new stuff), or even just put gold stars on their profiles.  But don’t give too much to 
the most active participants, or you’ll simply encourage them to dominate the 
system even more. 
• Promote quality contributors.  If you display all contributions equally, then 
people who post only when they have something important to say will be drowned 
out by the torrent of material from the hyperactive 1%.  Instead, give extra 
prominence to good contributions and to contributions from people who’ve 
proven their value, as indicated by their reputation ranking.  
 
Kerr and Tindale (2004) suggest that a “striking exception to this generally disappointing 
picture (regarding electronic group performance) is the facilitative effect of computerized 
brainstorming” (p. 627).  Group brainstorming is a method of idea generation in which 
groups are asked to: 1) generate as many ideas as possible, 2) avoid the criticism of ideas, 
and 3) combine and improve upon the ideas of others (Osborn, 1957, as cited by Kerr and 
Tindale, 2004).  While these brainstorming groups have been touted as being superior to 
equal-sized sets of non-interacting individuals (i.e., “nominal groups”), several decades 
of research has demonstrated that the reverse is true:  individuals usually outperform 
brainstorming groups (e.g., Mullen et al, 1991).  According to Kerr and Tindale (2004), 
such process losses in brainstorming groups appear to derive from three areas.  First, 
production blocking, or the inability for more than one group member to talk and think at 
a time, derails an ongoing train of thought (Nijstad, 2000).  Second, evaluation 
apprehension leads to a hesitance in contributing ideas, and finally, social comparison 
leads to low performance standards for face-to-face groups (Camacho, 1995; Larey & 
Paulus, 1995; Paulus & Dzindolet, 1993; Paulus et al, 1996; all as cited by Kerr and 
Tindale, 2004).  In response to these findings, several traditional group brainstorming 
improvements have been developed, the “most noteworthy” of which has been the 
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electronic brainstorming work.  According to Kerr and Tindale (2004), electronic 
brainstorming decreases the group brainstorming process losses by isolating individuals 
so that they can provide their ideas without interruption (i.e., reducing production 
blocking; Gallupe et al., 1994), allowing for anonymity (i.e., reducing evaluation 
apprehension; Cooper et al, 1998), and still providing group members to see others’ ideas 
at their convenience.  In fact, electronic brainstorming has been demonstrated to perform 
as well as non-interacting individuals (e.g., Gallupe et al, 1991), and to even outperform 
them (n . 9:  Dennis & Valacich, 1993, 1994; Valacich et al, 1994; all as cited by Kerr & 
Tindale).  Rather than being attributed to the relatively higher probability of large groups 
tapping into rare ideas (Connolly et al, 1993), these findings are thought to relate to the 
stimulating effect of exposure to others’ ideas (Leggett-Dugosh et al, 2000; Nijstad et al, 
2003; Paulus & Yang, 2000; although also see Ziegler et al, 2000; all as cited by Kerr & 
Tindale) and the diversity and heterogeneity of those groups (Schruijer & Mostert, 1997; 
Stroebe & Diehl, 1994; both as cited by Kerr & Tindale).                
 
In total, the current research into computer-mediated groups highlights several potential 
areas for future research.  First, there are very few empirical studies addressing how 
computer mediated performance compares with face-to-face performance in terms of 
decision effectiveness.  Moreover, the mechanisms circumscribing any existing 
differences have yet to be thoroughly delineated and explored4.  For example, 
communication variables like openness, participation, and equality, that have 
theoretically supported CMC decision-making groups over face-to-face groups, have not 
been empirically supported; yet, some aspects of electronic brainstorming (possibly these 
same variables) appear to convey benefit within CMC groups.  Alternative theoretical 
models predicting how computer-mediated groups may best be used have also yet to be 
thoroughly developed.      
 
Furthermore, two of the trends that Baltes et al. (2002) found in their review of existing 
studies offer opportunity for empirical expansion.  “First, the vast majority of studies 
utilized ad hoc groups of students engaging in hypothetical tasks as participants as 
opposed to organizational members role-playing realistic tasks for their work setting.  
Second…most existing studies (and thus the majority of studies included herein) examine 
synchronous, text-based conferencing systems (i.e., “chat”)” (p. 159) rather than e-mail.  
Because email is asynchronous, with even fewer paraverbal cues, Baltes et al. argue that 
it may be an even less effective method for reaching group decision than chat.  Thus, the 
Baltes et al. findings may actually be “underestimates of the decrement in effectiveness, 
increase in time required and changes in member satisfaction between face-to-face and 
computer-mediated communication” (Baltes et al., 2002, p. 174).  To address these gaps, 
future efforts may be geared toward the use of real organization settings and 
                                                 
4 Baltes et al. suggest that the functional perspective to group decision making (Cragan & Wright, 1990; 
Barge & Hirokawa, 1989; Gouran & Hirokawa, 1996; Hirokawa, 1985, 1988, 1994; Hirokawa, Gouran, & 
Martz, 1988; Hirokawa & Johnston, 1989), in which decision making effectiveness is seen as dependent on 
successfully understanding the problem, understanding requirements for an effective choice, and 
assessment of the alternatives, is an under-researched area in electronic communication that should be 
further examiend.   
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asynchronous communication methods, possibly including brainstorming and some 
aspects of Alternate Realty Games (Szulborski, 2005).   
 
Conclusion 
 
Group decision-making and electronic communication are integral to contemporary work 
organizations, and moreover, represent a ripe research context in which to solve wickedly 
difficult problems.  According to Kozlowski & Ilgen (2006), organizations worldwide are 
at least 15 years into “shifting from individual jobs in functionalized structures to teams 
embedded in more complex workflow systems (Devine, Clayton, Phillips, Dunford, & 
Melner, 1999; Lawler, Mohrman, & Ledford, 1992, 1995; Mathieu, Marks, & Zaccaro, 
2001).  This shift is being driven by increased competition, consolidation, and innovation 
which increase needs for the skill diversity, expertise, rapid response, and adaptability 
that groups may enable (Kozlowski, Gully, Nason, & Smith, 1999, as cited by Kozlowski 
& Ilgen (2006).  Add to this shift, the increased computer availability and broadband 
communication that enable groups to be distributed across time and space (Bell & 
Kozlowski, 2002b, as cited by Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006), and an interesting and complex 
research area emerges.  Kozlowski & Ilgen have argued that the confluence of such 
virtual groups with potentially worldwide membership is “inevitable and the source of 
new research challenges” including “how to harness the emerging technological 
capability to enhance and evolve team processes in virtual environments that cut across 
different cultures” (p. 114).   
 
Although there has already been well over half a century of research regarding small 
groups and related topics, several broad challenges remain if computer-mediated groups 
are to be effectively used to solve wickedly difficult problems.  First, much about group 
effectiveness remains unknown even within this substantial knowledge base.  Second, 
identifying what is known amongst such vast and multi-disciplinary literatures remains 
challenging (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006).  Add to these challenges, the research infancy of 
computer-mediated communications, and a great deal of empirical and theoretical work 
remains to be accomplished.  Work that is especially valuable considering that group 
decision making requires greater time and effort among those involved in the process 
than does individual decision making (Greitemeyer, Brodbeck, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, 
2006).  Thus, it is important to be able to justify this increased investment and to be able 
to mitigate potential pitfalls. 
   
Additionally, in order to solve wickedly difficult problems, the solution space must be 
extended beyond the laboratory environment of intellective tasks (e.g., tasks with a 
demonstrably correct answer) to tasks that because of their ambiguity are more difficult 
to empirically study.  In real-world organizational contexts, groups are seldom aware of 
whether they have made the correct decision, regardless of whether they are face-to-face 
or computer-mediated.  In fact, the correct answer is usually unavailable for teams 
outside the laboratory, because if the correct answer were available, there would be no 
reason to convene a team to make the decision (Roch & Ayman, 2005).  Interestingly, 
little research has examined a group’s judgment of its final decision (Roch & Ayman, 
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2005); however, “if a group cannot adequately evaluate the quality of a decision it has 
reached, it runs the risk of implementing a faulty decision” (Littlepage & Silbiger, 1992, 
p. 346, as referenced by Roch & Ayman).   
 
Because of Sandia National Laboratories’ mission, “a variety of research and 
development programs to help secure a peaceful and free world through technology” 
(Sandia National Laboratories external homepage, 2007), Sandia’s success is integrally 
intertwined with solving wickedly difficult issues, especially through computer-mediated 
means.  Achieving a better understanding of effective computer-mediated decision-
making could allow us to mitigate the deleterious decision-making effects and bolster 
potential benefits. 
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